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The goal of this study was to investigate the translate-
ability of creative works into other domains. We tested 
whether people were able to recognize which works of art 
were inspired by which pieces of music. Three expert 
painters created four paintings, each of which was the 
artist’s interpretation of one of four different pieces of 
instrumental music. Participants were able to identify 
which paintings were inspired by which pieces of music at 
statistically significant above-chance levels. The findings 
support the hypothesis that creative ideas can exist in an at 
least somewhat domain-independent state of potentiality 
and become more well-defined as they are actualized in 
accordance with the constraints of a particular domain.  
 Introduction   
Where does the uniqueness of a creative work come 
from? The creative process involves inspiration, 
translation, and re-interpretation, as well as the accessing 
and combining of knowledge, experiences, and ideas, to 
come up with new creative outputs (Cropley, 1999; 
Feldhusen, 1995, 2002; Munford & Gustafson, 1988; 
Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). One source of the uniqueness 
of a creative work, at least with respect to creativity in the 
arts, appears to be the personal style of the creator. It was 
shown that an individual’s creative outputs exhibit an 
identifiable character that is recognizable not just within 
but also across domains (Gabora, O’Connor, & Ranjan, 
2012). For example, creative writing students familiar 
with each other’s writing (and not with each others art) 
guessed at above chance levels which fellow student had 
created which piece of art. Thus the uniqueness of a 
creative work derives, at least in part, from the personal 
style of the creator. 
 However, it is likely that the uniqueness of a particular 
creative work has other sources as well. Creative 
inspiration may come from a work in same domain as the 
                                                
 
work it inspires (as when one poem inspires an idea for 
another poem, and sometimes it is in a different domain as 
when a piece of music inspires a poem). New creative 
products often have a striking similarity to the known 
domain instances (Ward, 1994). Thus, in addition to the 
creative style of the creator himself or herself, another 
source of the uniqueness of a particular creative work 
might be one or more elements of the world that inspired 
the creator to initiate the creative work.  
 There are several phenomena suggesting that the 
creative work need not even be in the same domain as the 
inspirational source for the work, as in for example, an 
artist when an artist is so moved by a poem or film that 
that poem or film inspires him or her to create a painting. 
In the late nineteenth century, musical terminology was 
used as titles for the paintings. Another practice of this 
period was to associate particular kinds of music with 
particular colors. Music also frequently served as a direct 
inspiration for paintings, as it continues to do today. We 
now review phenomena that point to cross-domain 
interpretation of ideas as a source of the character of 
creative works: synesthesia, the practice of ekphrastic 
expression, and cross-domain style. 
Synesthesia 
Individuals referred to as synesthetes naturally and 
spontaneously translate stimuli into another sensory 
domain. For example, they may see particular letters and 
numbers in particular colors. Ramachandran (2003) 
proposes that synesthesia occurs as a result of hyper-
connectivity in the brain and partial collapse of the barrier 
between sensory domains. Artists, poets, and novelists, 
are more likely than average to be synesthetes, which 
suggests that synesthetically driven re-interpretation of 
inputs from one modality to another may play some role 




There is a tradition in the arts of interpreting art from one 
medium (e.g., oil paint) into another (e.g., watercolor) and 
thereby coming to know its underlying essence. This 
practice is referred to as ekphrastic expression. The idea 
behind ekphrastic expression is that an artist may have a 
more direct impact on an audience by translating one 
medium of art into another medium because this involves 
capturing, and thereby becoming intimate with, its 
underlying form or essence. Modern day film composers 
attempt to compose music that conveys the emotional tone 
of the events portrayed in a film, thereby heightening the 
viewer’s experience of these events. Thus film scoring 
can be seen as a form of ekphrasis. The application of 
ekphrastic methods in the arts supports the idea that 
creative individuals extract patterns of information from 
the constraints of the domains in which they were 
originally expressed, and transform them into other 
domains.  
Cross-Media Style  
Another reason to suspect that the character of creative 
works arises through cross-domain re-interpretations of 
creative ideas  is the widespread phenomenon of cross-
media style. This refers to artistic style that is 
demonstrated by works of art in more than one medium. 
For example, the term rococo is applied to the painting, 
sculpture, literature, and music of a certain period. These 
forms are considered to be abstract archetypal forms or 
potentialities that make the mind interested in certain 
processes or arrangements in the artwork (Burke, 1957). 
Evidence for cross-media style shows how works of art in 
different media could be similar in terms of 
psychophysical, collative, and ecological properties 
(Hasenfus, 1978). There is also a pattern in the choice of 
elements (i.e., colors, shapes, words, or instruments) made 
by an artist to create a novel piece of music, painting or 
writing (Berlyne, 1971).  
Aims of the Present Research 
The goal of the current research was to test the hypothesis 
that the uniqueness of a creative work derives partly from 
conceptual entities themselves which get abstracted and 
reinterpreted into different concrete forms by 
investigating whether it is possible to recognize the source 
of inspiration for a creative work when that source of 
inspiration comes from a different domain. In other 
words, we aimed to determine whether it is possible to 
identify a work of art that exists in one medium after it 
has been recreated in another medium.  
Methods 
This study examined whether people were able to 
correctly recognize which works of art were inspired by 
which pieces of music. The study was divided into two 
phases. In the first phase, artists created paintings in 
response to musical stimuli. In the second phase, naïve 
participants attempted to determine which piece of music 
was used as the source of inspiration for each artwork. 
Phase One 
In the first phase of the study, expert artists were asked to 
create four paintings, each of which was the artist's 
interpretation of one of four different pieces of 
instrumental music.  
 Participants. Three local expert artists, each with 
approximately 25 years of experience in the field of 
painting, were recruited for this study. They received 50$ 
each for their participation.  
 Musical Stimuli. Four pieces of piano music were used 
in this study. The pieces were selected from a pool of 45 
pieces chosen as exemplars of different musical styles: 
baroque classical, romantic, jazz and contemporary from 
commercially produced sound track CDs. Each of these 
original 45 pieces of music was cropped to three minutes 
duration, and then rated by three raters on 64 descriptive 
adjectives on five point Likert scales. The adjectives were 
derived from previous research on the collative properties 
of stimulus patterns, from measures of affective reactions 
to artwork (Berlyne, 1974), and from the affective 
circumplex (Russel, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). 
The raters had no previous training in music.  
 Factor analysis and multidimensional scaling were used 
to compute the basic dimensions of aesthetic experience 
in the ratings, and reveal how the 45 pieces of music were 
dispersed in the dimensional spaces. The Euclidean 
distances between the pieces of music across the spaces 
were used to select four pieces of music from different 
regions that were clearly dissimilar from each other. The 
four pieces of music selected were the following:  
 (1) ‘Love is a Mystery’ composed by Ludovico Einaudi 
 (2) Number 29 B Flat Major’, by Ludwig van 
Beethoven 
 (3) ‘Circus Gallop’ by Marc-André Hamelin  
 (4) ‘All of Me’ by Jon Schmidt 
 
 Creation of Artworks. Each of the three artists created 
one painting for each of the four pieces of piano music, 
for a total of 12 paintings. On the day that a painting was 
to be created, the artists were provided with a single piece 
of music. They were asked to reinterpret each piece of 
music as a painting, i.e., to paint imagining what the 
music would look like if it were a painting. They were 
instructed to paint while listening to the music, and 
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encouraged to listen to the music as many times as they 
wished while they painted. They were asked to paint using 
the materials they thought could most effectively express 
the music (e.g., watercolors, oils, acrylic, or chalk). All 
participants were instructed to take up to a maximum of 
120 minutes to listen to the music and complete the 
painting.  
 The paintings were created in the artists’ personal 
studios. The artists were instructed to complete their 
painting at one sitting without interruption until they were 
finished. In order to limit the influence of the previous 
piece of music on the new painting, artists were instructed 
not to re-listen to the piece of music after the painting was 
finished, and there was a gap of four days between each 
painting session.  
 Representative examples of the music-inspired 
paintings obtained in Phase One of the study are provided 
in Figures 1 and 2. These paintings constituted the stimuli 




Figure 1. A painting created by one of the artists in response to 




Figure 2. A painting generated by one of the artists as an 
interpretation of the piece ‘All of Me’ composed by Jon Schmidt. 
 Phase Two.  
In the second phase of the study we tested whether people 
are able to recognize which pieces of music were 
interpreted as which paintings.  
 Participants. 52 undergraduates enrolled in psychology 
courses at the University of British Columbia participated 
in the study using the SONA system which matches 
research projects to potential particiaptns. They received 
partial course credit for their participation.  
 Procedure and Materials. This part of the study was set 
up online. The four pieces of music and the twelve 
paintings from Phase One were used. Each painting was 
displayed on a different webpage, which participants 
looked at one at a time. In addition to the painting, each 
webpage had links to the four pieces of music. 
Participants were asked to look at the painting, to listen to 
the four pieces of music, and identify which piece of 
music they think was most likely to have inspired the 
painting that appeared on that page. 
 Analytic Methods. Two statistics, H and Hu, were 
computed to assess the accuracies of the participants’ 
paintings-to-music matches. H is the simple hit rate, or the 
proportion of correct guesses. The Hu was based on signal 
detection theory research and it corrects for chance 
guessing and for response bias, such as the tendency to 
use particular response categories more or less than other 
response categories (Wagner, 1993). H and Hu were 
computed for each participant. One-sample t-tests and a 
data randomization procedure (Manly, 2007) were then 
used to assess the statistical significance of the mean H 
and Hu values. This was accomplished by determining 
whether the mean H and Hu values were significantly 
different from the H and Hu values that would have been 




The results of this study are summarized in Table 1. The 
mean hit rates were H = .51 and Hu = .54. The mean hit 
rates that would have been obtained on the basis of 
random guesses for these questions were .25 and .25, 
respectively. Both hit rates were statistically significant 
according to both conventional and data randomization t-
tests (t (51) = 6.9, p < .001, and t (51) = 7.2, p < .001). 
The r effect sizes were large, .70 and .71. Thus 
participants were able to identify at above-chance levels 
which paintings were inspired by which pieces of music.  
 








Hit Rate (H) .51 .25 6.9 (51) .70 
Unbiased Hit 
Rate (Hu) 
.54 .25 7.2 (51) .71 
 
Table 1: Table for Mean Hit Rates, t-Test values, and r Effect 
Size for identification of paintings inspired by the four pieces of 
music. All hit rates and t values were statistically significant at 
the .05 level. 
Discussion 
To our knowledge, no previous study has tested the 
hypothesis that the core idea behind a creative work is 
recognizable when it is translated from one domain to 
another. This hypothesis was supported by our finding 
that when pieces of music were re-interpreted as 
paintings, naïve participants were able to guess 
significantly above chance which piece of music inspired 
which painting. Although the medium of expression is 
different, something of its essence of the idea remains 
sufficiently intact for an observer to detect a resemblance 
between the new work and the source that inspired it.  
 There is a longstanding a debate concerning the extent 
to which the semantic complexity of artistic works is 
amenable to scientific methods (Becker, 1982). We 
suggest that at their core, creative ideas may be much less 
domain-dependent than they are generally assumed to be, 
and that indeed it is possible for their domain-specific 
aspects to be stripped away such that they exist in an 
abstracted state of potentiality and being re-expressed in 
another form. This interpretation of the results is 
consistent with a number of other phenomena, such as 
synesthesia and ekphrastic expression, discussed in the 
Introduction. The research reported on here may be a step 
toward distinguishing between domain-specific and 
domain-general aspects of creative works. The notion that 
the uniqueness of a creative work derives at least in part 
from, not just the personal style of the creator, but from 
encounters with works in domains that differ from the 
domain of the creative output, or even different kinds of 
experiences altogether, suggests that creative works 
emerge from a state of potentiality that can manifest in 
different domains. A creative idea can exist in form that is 
freed of the constraints of a particular domain, and that 
the creator’s job may be in part to, to simply allow that 
domain-independent entity to take a particular form, using 
domain-specific expertise and the tools of his or her trade. 
Over time they may become more fully actualized, and 
well-defined, as they are considered from different 
perspectives in accordance with the constraints of the 
domain in which they are expressed. It was suggested that 
this is because an individual’s creative outputs are 
expressions of a particular underlying uniquely structured 
self-organizing internal model of the world, or worldview. 
The proposal that creativity reflects the tendency of a 
worldview to transform in such a way as to find 
connections, reduce dissonance, and achieve a more stable 
structure. When a work is translated from one domain 
(e.g., music) into another (e.g., painting), the two works 
will be recognizably related because they are expressions 
of the same core idea. This view of creativity is consistent 
with previous research showing that midway through a 
creative process, an idea may exist in a state of 
potentiality in a ‘half-baked’ state of potentiality, in which 
one or more elements are ill-defined (Gabora, 2001, 2005, 
2010, 2011; Gabora & Holmes, 2010; Gabora & Saab, 
2011; Schwartz & Gabora, submitted). 
 Although that idea that at least some creative tasks 
involve the abstraction of form from one domain and re-
expression of it into another domain seems intuitively 
obvious to many of the artists we have spoken with, it 
stands in contrast with most academic theories of 
creativity. Creativity is typically portrayed as a process of 
searching and selecting amongst candidate ideas that exist 
in discrete, well-defined states. This can be traced back to 
early views arising in the artificial intelligence 
community, wherein creativity was thought to proceed by 
heuristically guided search through a space of possible 
solutions (Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1957; Newell & 
Simon, 1972; Simon, 1973, 1986) or possible problem 
representations (e.g., Kaplan & Simon, 1990, Ohlsson, 
1992). The view that creativity proceeds through a 
process of search and selection also assumed in more 
contemporary theories, such as the theory that creativity is 
a Darwinian process; i.e., new ideas are obtained by 
generating variations more or less at random and selecting 
the best (e.g., Campbell, 1965; Simonton 1999a,b, 2005). 
The results reported here inevitably lead to the question 
of what it was about the paintings that made it possible to 
trace them to the artworks that had inspired them. 
Aesthetic perception stimulated by works of art, such as 
paintings, drawings, or sculptures, may lead to complex 
responses. These responses could be emotional, cognitive, 
behavioral, and/or physiological in nature, and amenable 
to re-expression in another form. One theory that may 
provide insight into the mechanisms underlying cross-
domain translation of ideas is common coding. According 
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to this theory, information in different brain regions is 
represented using the same basic coding system, thereby 
facilitating the sharing and re-interpretation of their 
contents. This is said to be particularly the case for three 
kinds of representations: motor representations, perceptual 
representations, and the covert activation of motor and 
perceptual representations that occurs when we imagine 
movements. Any one of these movement representations 
can automatically trigger the other two (Prinz, 1997). The 
common coding hypothesis could thus also at least 
partially account for the ability to re-interpret ideas across 
different domains, and to recognize the essence of the idea 
after it has been re-interpreted. Moreover, it allows for the 
possibility of recognizing dynamic inspirational sources 
(such as music) from static traces (such as paintings). 
Research by Feedberg and Gallese (2007) on the 
perceiving action in the artwork provides another possible 
clue to the mechanisms underlying cross-domain 
interpretation of creative ideas. They propose that art 
observers implicitly imitate the creative actions 
undertaken by the artist in the making of the work. In our 
study it is possible that observers were not just perceiving 
action in art but were also able to match it rhythm and 
tempo of the music. This phenomenon of action 
perception in paintings could also at least partially 
account for the ability to recognize the essence of ideas 
interpreted across domains. In order to recognize the 
inspiration of an artwork or a cross-media style, expertise 
in a domain might stimulate the action system while the 
observer imagines how the artwork was created.  
Future research will focus on the role of expertise in the 
recognition of a connection between works in different 
domains. We hypothesis that expertise in a domain might 
increase the activation of the action system while the 
observer imagines how the artwork got created, thereby 
enhancing the capacity for recognition of cross-domain 
re-interpretation in a task such as this. 
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